The Logic of Paradox, LP, is a first-order, three-valued logic that has been advocated by Graham Priest as an appropriate way to represent the possibility of acceptable contradictory statements. Second-order LP is that logic augmented with quantification over predicates. As with classical second-order logic, there are different ways to give the semantic interpretation of sentences of the logic. The different ways give rise to different logical advantages and disadvantages, and we canvass several of these, concluding that it will be extremely difficult to appeal to second-order LP for the purposes that its proponents advocate, until some deep, intricate, and hitherto unarticulated metaphysical advances are made.
Truth values of compound formulas are derived from those of their subformulas by the familiar "truth tables" of Kleene's (strong) 3-valued logic [9, §64] , but whereas for Kleene (thinking of the "middle value" as truth-valuelessness) only the top value (True) is designated, for Priest the top two values are both designated. As Priest might say: a formula which is both true and false is, after all, true. Valid formulas, then, are those which take (in every model, on every assignment of truth values to the atomic formulas) either True or Both as values; valid inferences are those whose conclusions never take False as value when all their premisses take either True or Both. Validities, therefore, include the Law of Excluded Middle (Priest assumes that every proposition has at least one of the two usual truth values), the classical principles of Double Negation, and the classical De Morgan equivalences and their quantificational analogues. (As a result, every valid formula of classical logic is valid in LP as well.) What is missing are some of the traditional rules of inference, such as Modus Ponens and the principle of Ex Falso Quodlibet (or "Explosion"): if A is both true and false, then both A and ¬A are true (as well as false), so they can't imply some (purely) false B. Logics of this general nature had been developed earlier, including in particular the investigations of Asenjo [1, 2] , whose logic is essentially just LP.
The model-theoretic semantics for a predicate logic of LP is, again, a natural generalization of that familiar from classical logic. Classically, a predicate is assigned an arbitrary subset of the domain of a model (for monadic predicates; a subset of a Cartesian power of the domain for polyadic) as its extension, and an atomic formula is true just in case the object (or tuple of objects) denoted by its singular term (or terms) belongs to the extension of its predicate. For LP, a predicate is assigned instead a pair of an extension and an antiextension, whose union must exhaust the domain (or Cartesian power of the domain, for relational predicates), but which are allowed to have a non-empty intersection. Atomic formulas have the value True if and only if the denotations of their individual terms are in the extension, but not the antiextension, of their predicate, the value False if they are in the antiextension but not the extension, and the value Both if they are in the intersection of the extension and antiextension. Universal (existential) quantifiers act like generalized conjunctions (disjunctions), taking the lowest (highest) value attained by any of their instances in the ordering False<Both<True. For some applications, Priest wants to use a Second-order version of LP. But here there are choices to be made, since Second-order logics can be interpreted in more than one way! In the "standard" semantics for classical Second-order logic, the (nadic) predicate variables are taken to range over all the permissible extensions for (n-adic) predicates: that is, over all subsets of the (n-fold Cartesian power of the) domain of individuals. In the analogous interpretation of Second-order LP (which, for short, we will call the standard interpretation), the predicate variables are again taken to range over all the permissible interpretations of predicates: over, in other words, all the appropriate <extension,antiextension> pairs. Priest suggests this interpretation in his expository article [13, pp. 338-339] . Second-order LP, on this standard interpretation, has some surprising properties. One, which Priest notes, is that there will be semantically valid sentences with semantically valid negations: ∀X∀x(Xx∨¬Xx), the quantified Law of Excluded Middle, is valid, but, since the Second-order domain will contain "over-defined" elements (<extension,antiextension> pairs with non-empty intersections), the statement that there are such properties, ∃X∃x(Xx ∧ ¬Xx), will also be valid, and by De Morgan and Quantifier Negation this statement is equivalent to ¬∀X∀x(Xx ∨ ¬Xx). Such a sentence, then, can be taken as the definiens for a propositional constant, b, which will have the value Both in every model. Note for future reference that replacing an atomic subformula of any formula with b, though it may change the value of the whole formula from True (or False) to Both, will never change its value from a designated one to the non-designated False.
First-order LP, like First-order classical logic, has complete proof procedures: with appropriate changes of rules, a system for LP can be given in the style of any textbook version of natural deduction. (For example, the Double Negation Elimination and Introduction rules, the "negative" Introduction and Elimination rules for ∧, ∨, ∀ and ∃ (as in Fitch [7] ); as well, a rule allowing the inter substitution of ⊃ with its definiens in LP. These, and the usual positive rules, yield complete systems when supplemented by an axiom scheme of Excluded middle.) Classical Secondorder Logic (on the standard interpretation) does not: its class of valid formulas is not recursively enumerable, and indeed, is of a very high recursion-theoretic degree. In contrast we have
Theorem 1
The class of valid Second-order LP formulas on the standard interpretation is recursively enumerable.
Proof
Without loss of generality, we may assume that all formulas are in prenex form: all quantifiers are initial. (The same prenexing equivalences hold in LP and classical logic.) It can be shown that, in the quantifier prefix, all the Second-order quantifiers may precede all the First-order. (∀x∀X and ∃x∃X are equivalent, respectively, to ∀X∀x and ∃X∃x. By appeal to the Axiom of Choice in the metatheory we can show that a formula with ∀x∃X, with X an n−adic predicate variable, in its prefix is equivalent to one having instead ∃Y∀x, with Y an (n + 1)−adic variable, and similarly for ∃x∀X and ∀Y∃x. This equivalence, for classical logic, is regularly appealed to in the study of definability hierarchies.)
The range of a predicate variable contains the maximally over-defined <extension, anti-extension> pair (the one in which each of the extension and antiextension is identical to the whole First-order domain or appropriate Cartesian power thereof). Any atomic formula with a predicate assigned this pair will have the truth value Both. Second-order existential quantifications are therefore trivial: any prenex formula is equivalent (in the sense that in any model one will have a designated value if and only if the other does) to that obtained by deleting its existential Second-order quantifiers and replacing each atomic formula containing a variable bound by one of the deleted quantifiers with b. Thus the only Second-order formulas we have to consider are those starting with a block of Second-order universal quantifiers, followed by a First-order formula (some of whose atomic subformulas may have variables bound to the initial quantifiers as predicates). But such a formula is valid if and only if the First-order sentence obtained by dropping the initial Second-order universal quantifiers and reconstruing the variables bound to them as predicate constants is valid. Thus the problem of axiomatizing the valid formulas of Secondorder LP reduces to that of the First-order logic. This completeness result can, however, be seen as an undesirable feature of Second-order LP. One of the things Second-order logic is valued for is the analysis it provides of mathematical theories and structures. Thus Frege and Dedekind showed that with each sentence of arithmetic we can associate a formula of Secondorder (classical) logic such that the sentence is true (as a description of the natural numbers) just in case the formula is valid (on the standard interpretation). The very fact that its valid formulas are recursively enumerable shows that no such correlation can be found for (standard-semantics) Second-order LP.
Another difference between Second-order LP and Classical Second-order logic is that Classical Second-order logic allows an axiom of infinity (a sentence, with no non-logical vocabulary, true in all and only models with an infinite domain of individuals). However,
Theorem 2
In Second-order LP, any (purely logical) sentence that is satisfiable at all (i.e., takes a designated value in some model) is satisfiable in a model with just a single individual.
Proof
The proof of this is easy enough, once we note that the "delete existential Second-order quantifiers" bit from Theorem (1) doesn't just yield a formula equivalent to the original in the sense of being satisfiable if and only if, but something a bit stronger: for every cardinal number, if the original is satisfiable in a model with that many individuals, the modified formula is also satisfiable with the same individuals. But now: a standard Second-order LP model with just one individual has just three items in the range of any predicate variable: one that makes all atomic formulas with that variable True, one that makes them all False, and one that makes them all Both. But things that do this are present in all models, namely, the three <extension,antiextension> pairs, where D denotes the entire domain: <D, ∅>, <∅, D> and <D, D>. So any sentence starting with Second-order universal quantifiers, if it is true (= True or Both) in some model with lots of individuals will a fortiori be true in the model with only one! This problem is related to a well-known expressive weakness of First-order LP, its lack of a full-service conditional connective. In LP, Modus Ponens fails for the conditional connective (A ⊃ B) (as equivalent to (¬A ∨ B) or ¬(A ∧ ¬B)). (If A has the value Both and B False, A and (A ⊃ B) both have designated values but B is undesignated.) Because of this there is no obvious way of formulating the principle of mathematical induction in Second-order LP. We would like to be able to infer ∀nXn from X0 and ∀n(Xn ⊃ X(n + 1)), but this inference is not in general valid. (Let X be assigned < {0}, N >. Then X0 and ∀n(Xn ⊃ X(n + 1)) will both have the value Both, the latter because (X0 ⊃ X1) has Both and all other instances True, but ∀xXx has the value False since all but the first of its instances have False.)
Another consequence of LP's lack of a usable conditional is that it is not possible to "encode" the valid inferences of Second-order LP in valid formulas. In classical logic the inference from A to B is valid if and only if the formula (A ⊃ B) is valid, but this does not hold for LP.
Theorem 3
Valid inference in Second-order LP is not recursively enumerable.
Proof
Consider the conjunction, P, of Robinson's seven axioms for inductionless arithmetic with the usual Second-order axiom of induction,
This conjunction is true (though also, because of its universally quantified Second-order conjunct, also false: it takes the value Both) in Secondorder LP models with the genuine natural numbers as individuals and in many, though not all, of the finite inconsistent models described in Priest [12] : those in which the number series, perhaps after a linear initial segment, forms a loop. Robinson's axioms are true (i.e., have either the value True or the value Both) in all of these models. Now consider the instance of the induction axiom given by assigning some particular <exten-sion,antiextension> pair to the variable X. The instance can only have the value False if its consequent does: if, that is, some number falls in the antiextension but not the extension. If 0 falls in the antiextension, the antecedent of the instance will have either the value False (if 0 is not also in the extension) or Both (if it is), and in either case the whole instance will have one of the designated values. So assume that X0 is true. Then in going along the number series from 0 to the n for which Xn takes the value False, we must at some step go from a number in the extension to one not in the extension. But this is enough to give the second conjunct of the antecedent one of the values False or Both, and again this will give the whole antecedent one of these values, and so the instance as a whole one of the values True or Both. (The induction axiom will, however, take the value False in models with "nonstandard" numbers, whether arranged in an infinite series as in classical non-standard models of arithmetic or in a circle unconnected to 0 as in [12] 's finite models.)
The only sentences of the language of First-order arithmetic taking designated values in all models of P (since the model based on the genuine natural numbers is one of them) are those true of the genuine natural numbers. Thus, where S is a sentence of First-order arithmetic, the inference from P to S is a semantically valid inference of Second-order LP just in case S is true. Since, by Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem the truths of First-order arithmetic are not recursively enumerable, it follows that the valid inferences of Second-order LP, unlike its valid formulas, are not recursively enumerable.
Identity
Our Theorems (1) and (2) are consequences of the limited expressive power of Second-order LP. There are other consequences. One non-mathematical reason for philosophical interest in Second-order logic, to which Priest appeals in his recent [2014] , is the possibility of defining identity by Leibniz's Law:
Since the transitivity of identity is derivable from its reflexivity and symmetry by use of the Rule of Substitution of Identicals, this rule will also not be valid when identity is defined in this way. For, using this definition, and the facts that ≡ is reflexive and symmetric in LP, Priest concludes that identity will likewise be reflexive and symmetric, i.e., that the following are semantically valid:
However, Priest notes that if A is True and B is Both then A ≡ B is Both in LP; and if in addition C is False, then B ≡ C is Both in LP. However, A ≡ C will be False in LP. Or in other words, ≡ is not an equivalence relation in LP because it is not transitive. From this Priest concludes that identity is not transitive, using Definition (1).
Much of Priest's view concerning the various manifestations of the "problem of unity and oneness" in [14] derives from this foundation. But the definition of identity in Definition (1) is dubious if Second-order LP has its standard interpretation. For, one item in the range of (monadic) predicate variables is the totally overdefined pair < D, D >. When this pair is assigned to the predicate variable X, Xa and also Xa ⊃ Xa will take the value Both, for any a in the First-order domain. Thus, when identity is defined as above, a = a will have the value Both for every a. It is part of Priest's philosophical program that some, paradoxical, objects may be analyzed as being both identical to and distinct from themselves, but he has always hoped that consistent accounts could be given of "ordinary" things: selfidentity should not be universally dialetheic! (Replacing ⊃ in the above definition of identity with the new conditional ⇒ discussed below makes no difference: a = a will still always have the value Both.)
It would seem preferable, in systems formulated in Second-order LP, to include identity of individuals as an additional primitive rather than defining it as can be done in Second-order classical logic.
Second-order LP: General Semantics
In discussions of classical Second-order logic, the standard interpretation is often (though not always) the most interesting. The considerations given above suggest that standardly interpreted Second-order LP is less interesting and less useful. It would seem that Graham Priest has also come to this view: in discussing Secondorder LP in [14, pp. 28-29] , he recommends instead what is called a "general" interpretation. For classical Second-order logic this is one on which the predicate variables are taken to range over non-empty subsets of the powerset of the individual domain (or of the powersets of its Cartesian powers, for polyadic predicates), but not necessarily the full powerset. For Second-order LP, correspondingly, it would be one on which they range over non-empty sets of <extension,antiextension> pairs.
"General" semantics is thus a cover term for a very diverse range of interpretations, validating a diverse range of logics. Further specification is needed if we are to state any interesting conclusions, and, depending on the goals sought, logicians have specified different kinds of "general" models. For example, in [8] , which introduced general interpretations of classical higher-order logic, there were specified closure conditions that have to be imposed on the ranges of higher-order variables in order to validate comprehension principles. We would like to ask whether the results of §2 carry over to the logic given by a semantics acceptable from the point of view of Priest's philosophical project. Priest, however, leaves this as a topic for future work, suggesting that a full characterization of the semantics of Second-order logic ought to depend on a "robust theory of properties." In this he is making contact with the work of other Australian metaphysicians like David Armstrong and John Bigelow.
Until the metaphysicians have provided an appropriate theory of universals we can make only tentative comments. The first part of the proof of Theorem (1) -the equivalence of every sentence of Second-order LP to one whose Second-order quantifiers are all initial -assumes that the logic validates choice principles, so it may fail on many proposals. The second part of the proof -the eliminability of Second-order existential quantifiers -and the results on identity ( §3) require only the presence of a few special items, the everywhere Both predicates of each adicity, in the Secondorder domains. They are likely to hold, therefore, on many possible versions of the general semantics. In particular, if the models validate the principle of Comprehension, these items seem forced on us. (Since LP does not have a usable conditional connective, Comprehension cannot be stated as an axiom scheme. It can, however, be embodied in rules of substitution for Second-order variables, as in Church [6] , Chapter 5.) Comprehension in effect postulates that every formula of the language defines a property in the appropriate Second-order domain. Now suppose that at least one sentence (closed formula) takes the value Both -after all, a dialetheist would hardly be interested in a logic where this isn't the case! Conjoining this sentence with an arbitrary valid formula with n free individual yields a formula defining an n-ary relation taking the value Both for every n-tuple individuals. This may not be a conclusive objection, however, since some proponents of "sparse" theories of universals have held that the domain of properties is not closed under conjunction, and the Second-order logics corresponding to their theories would therefore not validate Comprehension.
Enriching Second-order LP with New Operators
Many logicians, including many interested in the foundations of mathematics, are interested in Second-order logic specifically because of the expressive power that is lost when we move from standard to general semantics. The categorical axiomatizations it allows of, e.g., the arithmetic of natural numbers, do not allow of complete proof procedures, but they do provide definitions of interesting mathematical structures, and First-order axiomatizations are seen as approximations to them. So perhaps there is some interest in trying to add Second-order quantification to LP in a way which allows us to keep the full expressive power of standardly interpreted Second-order logic and avoids our anomalous Theorem (1). One possibility is to enrich the language of LP with a new conditional operator. Leave the interpretations of ¬, ∧ and ∨, and of the quantifiers, as in LP, but add a new operator, ⇒ with the interpretation that A ⇒ B takes the value True when A has the value False, and otherwise takes the same value as B -see [3] . (This is a genuine addition to the language of LP: it is easy to see that Modus Ponens is valid for this conditional: if A and A ⇒ B both have designated values, so will B, but [5] shows that there is no operator that is definable within LP that has such a property.) Note that the interpretation of ⇒ differs from the defined ⊃ in only one case: when A has the value Both and B has the value False, A ⊃ B takes the designated value Both but A ⇒ B takes the undesignated False. Call LP augmented with this new connective LPA. [16] has studied First-order LPA: it has a natural and efficient proof procedure, and can serve as the logical framework for a number of interesting inconsistent axiomatic extensions of First-order arithmetic: LP itself, not having a full-service conditional operator, is not suitable for formulating axioms from which deductions are to be made. [16] 's interest is proof-theoretic, but we can look at it semantically.
Second-order LPA is expressively powerful, as we shall see, but in ways that may make it inappropriate for use in the context of a dialetheist philosophy. For a start, the logic of ⇒ in LPA is precisely identical to that of ⊃ in classical logic: a formula (inference) in which ⇒ is the only connective occurring is valid in LPA if and only if the corresponding formula (inference) with ⊃ everywhere replacing ⇒ is classically valid. (Proof: squint at the truth table for ⇒ until the cells for the two designated values True and Both blur together, and it will look just like the classical truth table for ⊃.) As remarked, this means that ⇒ supports Modus Ponens: it is a "detachable" conditional. It also means that ⇒ supports Contraction:
Although a conditional with these properties might be suitable for certain dialetheic applications, there will be many for which it is inappropriate. One of the main motivating goals of dialetheism has been that of recovering the naturalness of "naïve" set theory and a similarly naïve theory of truth and satisfaction. This will not be attainable with LPA because ⇒ will allow the derivation of Curry's Paradox for set theory and the similar Löb's Paradox in the theory of truth.
Second-order LPA has even more (disturbing?) classical-like features, and can, in fact, be seen as including full classical logic. By using Second-order quantifiers, we can define propositional constants. We have already seen the constant b, which takes the value Both in any model. Since the domain over which monadic predicate variables range contains the pair of the null set with the whole First-order domain, that is, < ∅, D >, and since if X is assigned this pair, any formula Xa will have the value False, it follows that the sentence ∀x∀X(Xx) will have the value False in every model: unlike any formula of First-order LP, it is unsatisfiable. It may thus be taken as the definiens of a propositional Falsum constant, f:
Dually, since the domain over which monadic predicate variables range contains the pair of the whole First-order domain with the null set, that is, < D, ∅ >, and since if X is assigned this pair, any formula Xa will have the value True, it follows that the sentence ∃x∃X(Xx) will have the value True in every model, and can be taken as the definiens of a propositional Verum constant t.
Not only is t valid, it, unlike any formula of First-order LP, takes the value True in every model. (Note that the full language of Second-order logic is not required for these definitions. If we just add propositional quantifiers to the language of propositional LP, and so move to the language of what Church [6] , §28 calls the extended propositional calculus, we can define f, b and t by ∀p(p), ∃p(p ∧ ¬p) and ∃p(p), respectively.)
Since f never takes a designated value, any formula whatever may validly be inferred from it. But the logic of ∧, ∨ and ⇒ is exactly the same as the classical logic of ∧, ∨ and ⊃. (If one thinks of True and Both as subspecies of the classical truthvalue true, the truth tables for ∧, ∨ and ⇒ can be seen as simply complicated versions of the classical tables for ∧, ∨ and ⊃.) Defining a new negation operator by
therefore, we obtain full classical logic with its principle of Explosion: A and NA together validly imply B, where B can be any formula whatever. (Before using this logic, then, a defender of a dialetheist treatment of semantic or metaphysical paradoxes would have to explain why ¬A, rather than NA, is the "real" negation of A.) Np takes the value True iff p has the value False, and the value False otherwise. In particular, Np takes the value False when p has the value Both. (Np ∨ N¬p) is therefore True if p has one of the two classical truth values (and False otherwise): so we can abbreviate it Cp = d f (Np ∨ N¬p) as a "classicality" operator, meaning that p has a classical value. With this we can faithfully interpret classical logic in our logic. For the propositional case, the conditional ((Cp 1 ∧ Cp 2 ∧ · · Cp n ) ⇒ ϕ) (where the antecedent asserts the classicality of all the atoms that occur in the consequent ϕ), is LPA-with-f valid if and only if the formula ϕ is classically valid. For the case of First-order logic, the antecedent must also contain conjuncts asserting the classicality of the predicates occurring in φ: ∀xCF x, and similarly for polyadic predicates. For the case of Second-order logic, we have to modify the consequent by restricting its Second-order quantifiers to classical properties and relations: by replacing each subformula in it of the form This embedding of full classical Second-order logic in Second-order LPA gives us, in striking contrast to our Theorem (1),
Theorem 4
The class of valid Second-order LPA formulas on the standard interpretation is not recursively enumerable, and is of the same complexity as the class of valid Second-order classical formulas.
Other writers have also explored the possibilities of supplementing LP with a conditional operator (e.g., [4] , and the second (2006) edition of [11] ). Our trivialization results for LP with ⇒ can be seen as illustrating just how difficult the task they have undertaken really is: a simple and obvious conditional operator is not adequate to their purposes. Perhaps some non-simple and non-obvious conditional operator will prove to be suitable, but the choices available for (truth-functional) connectives in a three-valued setting that are sufficiently like a conditional are quite limited: besides the LP conditional, there seems to be the ⇒, the RM3 conditional → rm3 , and a Łukasiewicz conditional → ł . 1 Although we have not discussed the RM3-and Ł-conditionals, it is not so clear to us that they will fare any better than ⇒ has fared; it can be seen from the following truth tables that the conditionals all share certain features that may lead them all to manifesting these difficulties. But that's a topic for future discussion. A simple observation may highlight the way in which the additional expressive power of Second-order (or Propositional) quantification can change the character of the underlying propositional logic. Neither LP nor LPA is a functionally complete three-valued logic: on an assignment giving classical values (True or False) to every sentence letter, every formula of either propositional LP or propositional LPA will receive a classical value; thus, no connective producing a formula with the value Both when applied to arguments with classical values is definable in either. When the constants f, b, and t 2 (which we have seen are definable by means of higher order quantifiers) are added as primitives to First-order LPA, however, we get a functionally complete system. We call this system LPA+. The new negation, N, is what is called, in the standard terminology of multi-valued logic [15] , a J-function for the value False: an operator which, applied to a formula with that value, yields one with the value True, and applied to anything else yields one with the value False. More generally, a J-operator of value n in many-valued logic is an operator which, applied to a formula with the truth value n, yields the top, truest, truth value, and applied to anything else yields the bottom, falsest, truth value. Thus: J n (ϕ) = True if ϕ = n = False otherwise As just mentioned, N is a J-function for the value False; N¬ϕ has the value True if ϕ has the value True and the value False otherwise, and so can be taken as a Jfunction for True. The only way p and ¬p can both have designated values is if p has the value Both, so (NNp ∧ NN¬p) gives a J-function for Both. So we have
Proof
The proof is a straightforward generalization of the well-known two-valued method of constructing a formula in disjunctive normal form that exhibits some arbitrary truth-table. In the many-valued case, we construct the formulas that each "describe a row" of the many-valued truth table as follows. For each of the n propositional variables (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , · · · ϕ n ) in the formula, every row will have assigned one of the values True, Both or False to that variable. Whatever the value of that assignment is, it is described by the J-operator of that value as applied to the relevant ϕ i . These n J-formulas are conjoined, and the result is conjoined with whatever constant corresponds to the value of the formula at that row. So, each row will be described by a formula of the form
where the a, b . . . i are the truth-values (t, b or f) assigned to the propositional variables ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 · · · ϕ n in that row and k is the value (one of t, b or f) that the formula takes with those values assigned to the atomic propositions. We now disjoin all these sentences that "describe a row" and we have a (generalized) disjunctive normal form sentence that has the arbitrarilychosen many-valued truth-table.
Notes
1. In the second edition of [11] , Priest has sought to supplement LP with a conditional → that satisfies identity (ϕ → ϕ) and modus ponens; but because of Curry's paradox, this → is not to satisfy contraction. (See [4] also for discussion.) But it seems that we would then not have a truth-functional conditional connective, as initially imagined for LP.
2. We don't actually need t, of course, since that is definable by ¬f.
